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DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF YOU DON'T:
RELIGIOUS SHUNNING AND THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE
JUSTIN K. MILLERt
Throughout history, families and religious groups have recognized
their influence over the lives of their members and have used this influ-
ence to maintain unity and adherence to a given set of values.1 The
scenario in which the head of the family threatens to disown the prodi-
gal child is familiar because it strikes an elemental chord: the fear that
parental love will be withdrawn, casting the child adrift in the world
with no identity and no roots.2 The myth has ancient origins: in the
Bible, Adam and Eve were thrown out of the Garden of Eden for dis-
obeying God's command.'
Today, many religious groups consider themselves to be God's
"chosen" people, frequently to the exclusion of others.4 When religious
groups believe that they are the "chosen," they may treat former mem-
bers in a way that is intended to cause them hardship. This may occur
whether the group expels or excommunicates a member against her
t B.A. 1983, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 For example, some small Jewish communities keep a "bluebook" in which the
names of community members, along with the amount they have donated to charities,
are published to reinforce commonly held values of generosity and charity. See B.
RAVEN & J. RuBiN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: PEOPLE IN GROUPS 338 (1976).
2 Cf id. at 43-45 (anxiety tends to make people desire affiliation with others)
(quoting E. BERSCHEID & E. WALSTER, INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION 32 (1969)); S.
SCHACHTER, TiE PSYCHOLOGY OF AFFILIATION 13-14 (1959).
1 See Genesis 3:23-24 (Oxford Annotated Bible rev. standard version)
("[T]herefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground
from which he was taken. He drove out the man; and at the east of the garden of Eden
he placed the cherubim, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to guard the
way to the tree of life." (verse citation omitted)). The rest of biblical history can be
interpreted as a consequence of Adam's sin. See THE READER'S BIBLE: A NARRATIVE
xix-xx (R. Frye ed. 1965); see also THE WRITINGS OF MARTIN BUBER 28 (W. Her-
berg ed. 1956) ("We each reenact Adam's 'fall,' which 'continually happens here and
now in all its reality."' (quoting Buber, The Faith of Judaism, in ISRAEL AND THE
WORLD: ESSAYS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 17 (1948))).
" This has been a recurrent phenomenon historically. See M. BEN-HORIN, COM-
MON FAITH-UNCOMMON PEOPLE: ESSAYS IN RECONSTRUCTIONIST JUDAISM 26
(noting the doctrine of "choseness" in the Jewish religion); 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RELIGION 75 (M. Eliade ed. 1987) (discussing the doctrine of election in Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam); THE READER'S BIBLE, supra note 3, at xxi (describing the race
of Abraham as God's choice for a "laboratory school for the development of a concep-
tion of human personality and ...society").
(271)
272 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
will or the former member leaves of her own accord.
This Comment discusses the practice of "shunning," which in-
volves the complete withdrawal of social, spiritual, and economic
contact from a member or former member of a religious group.'
The shunned person can lose, among other things, her spouse,'
5 A number of religions currently practice this extreme form of shunning. The
practice of Bann und Meidung is a moral principle in the Amish community. Trans-
lated, the words mean excommunication and shunning.
Meidung requires that members receive no favors from the excommuni-
cated person, that they do not buy from or sell to an excommunicated
person, that no member shall eat at the same table with an excommuni-
cated person, and if the case involves husband or wife, they are to suspend
their usual marital relations.
J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 63 (1963); see also R. BEAR, DELIVERED UNTO SA-
TAN 1-4 (1974) (discussing a similar practice in the Reformed Mennonite Church).
Jehovah's Witnesses shun members after a process called "disfellowshipping."
"Members of the Jehovah's Witness community are prohibited-under threat of their
own disfellowship-from having any contact with disfellowshipped persons and may
not even greet them." Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d
875, 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987); see also J. BERGMAN, JEHO-
VAH'S WITNESSES AND KINDRED GROUPS at xxiii "(1984) (discussing how dissenting
Witnesses, who in 1938 voluntarily left the Society because of doctrinal differences,
were "treated with indignation and animosity by their former brothers"). Family mem-
bers are required to shun other family members who are disfellowshipped. See id. For
other examples of religious groups that practice shunning, see Grunwald v. Ben Zion
Bornfreund, No. CV-85-3338 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1988) (discussing siruv niddui and
herem, forms of excommunication in the Orthodox Jewish community); Quiner v.
Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 504 (Ct. App. 1967) (discussing the "concept of 'separa-
tion,'" which, as practiced by a Christian sect called the Plymouth Brethren, or "Ex-
clusive Brethren," entails minimizing contacts with persons outside the group); In re
Marriage of Hadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566, 569, 619 P.2d 374, 376 (1980) (describing
the First Community Church's practice of shunning and ostracizing members).
Shunning is not a practice limited to religious groups:
British workers have been known to carry the "silent treatment" to an
extreme, as in the case of a worker who is "sent to Coventry." In this
form of ostracism, no one will speak to the deviant or his family unless it
is absolutely necessary. The effect can be devastating to the point of
suicide.
B. RAVEN & J. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 324-25.
6 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 72-73 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied
434 U.S. 1048 (1978) (marriage ended in divorce when, after husband was disfellow-
shipped for smoking cigarettes, wife refused to communicate with him); Quiner, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 504-05 (wife, who belonged to the "Exclusive Brethren," adhered to its
doctrine of separation, which prevented her from interacting with her husband); Lin-
derman v. Linderman, 364 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (marriage ended
in divorce when wife was shunned after leaving church group); Bear v. Reformed
Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 332-33, 341 A.2d 105, 106 (1975) (after husband
was excommunicated from church, wife would not speak to him); cf. Mohn v. Tingley,
191 Cal. 470, 489, 217 P. 733, 742 (1923) (leader of Theosophical Society caused
member to leave his wife); Radecki v. Schuckardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d 92, 92, 361 N.E.2d
543, 544 (1976) (plaintiff alleged that Bishop of Christ the King Priory, Inc., caused
his wife, who was a member, to leave him); Bradesku v. Antion, 21 Ohio App. 2d 67,
68-69, 255 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1969) (wife filed for divorce after minister of Radio
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children,' business," and standing in the community.
Unique legal issues are raised when people who are shunned sue
their churches. Shunning frequently causes a collision of state common
law, family law, and the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
Religious groups shun former members out of the sincere religious con-
viction that they are doing the right thing, but such conduct intention-
ally hurts the person who is shunned. Shunning is not evil in itself, but,
if groups are given license to shun at will, there is potential for abuse.
By definition, shunning seeks to quell dissent and subject individuals to
the will of the group. This Comment questions whether the Constitu-
tion should elevate the rights of religious groups above the rights of
individual members of religious groups. It concludes that absolute con-
stitutional protection for shunning is inappropriate.
This Comment begins by outlining the constitutional protections
given to religiously motivated conduct under contemporary interpreta-
tions of the first amendment, and it proposes that the standard enunci-
ated in Sherbert v. Verner,9 which dictates when religious practices
should be excepted from facially neutral government regulations, be ap-
plied cautiously in shunning cases. The Comment then argues that the
Church of God wrote her a letter stating that her relationship with her husband was
adulterous because he had been married previously); Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wash. 2d
536, 538, 419 P.2d 132, 135 (1966) (church pastor required member's wife to take an
oath that she would not listen to her husband and would not leave her church).
See Bear, 462 Pa. at 332, 341 A.2d at 106.
8 See, e.g., Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, 568-69, 25 N.E. 74, 74-75 (1890)
(excommunicated physician sued for damages that would be caused to his business be-
cause priest refused to minister to sick people while under the same roof as the physi-
cian); Fitzgerald v. Robinson, 112 Mass. 371, 381 (1873) (priest derided parishioner in
front of an assembled congregation, proclaiming that "[h]e keeps a bad place of resort"
and warning the parishioners to "keep away from it"); Bear, 462 Pa. at 333, 341 A.2d
at 106 (shunned former church member found himself "unable to hire workers, obtain
loans or market his produce"); Heinrichs v. Wiens, 31 D.L.R. 94, 97 (Sask. 1916)
(shunned member of a Mennonite congregation brought an action against church of-
ficers for boycotting his business); cf. Lide v. Miller, 573 S.W.2d 614, 614-15 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978) (dentist sued elders of church claiming that they had injured his dental
practice by reading a statement of his alleged misconduct to the assembled
congregation).
9 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("[N]o showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissi-
ble limitation.'" (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945))). The Court
has articulated this standard in many different ways since Sherbert. See, e.g., United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (stating that a state may regulate religious
liberty if the regulation is "essential to accomplish an overriding governmental inter-
est"); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)
("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbal-
ance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.").
1988]
274 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
state interest in regulating the behavior that gives rise to common law
torts regarding marital and business relations is sufficient to override
blanket claims of free exercise immunity by religious groups that shun
former members. Courts should not read Sherbert to protect all forms
of shunning, but instead should weigh the religious concerns of both
parties to a shunning dispute before determining whether either party's
behavior is protected under the free exercise clause. Surprisingly, no
court has ever considered this approach. The free exercise rights of per-
sons who are shunned have been ignored.
Finally, this Comment argues for a different test when religious
shunning is an issue in child custody disputes. This new test would
require custody decisions to be made on a religion-blind basis unless
the shunning of one parent by the other threatens substantial harm to
the child.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1° This guarantee is ap-
plicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.1 Government
is thus under dual constraints when it acts in ways that affect reli-
gion." Too much accommodation of a particular religion, or of religion
in general, may constitute an unconstitutional "establishment" of reli-
gion.3 A widely publicized example of a governmental "establishment"
of religion is mandatory school prayer.'4 On the other hand, facially
neutral government regulations will often place a burden upon a partic-
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"I See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("We hold that the
[state] statute, as construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty
without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The funda-
mental concept of liberty embodied in th[e Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liber-
ties guaranteed by the First Amendment.").
12 See id. ("On the one hand [the First Amendment] forestalls compulsion by law
of the acceptance of any creed . . . .On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise
of the chosen form of religion.").
13 See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("[lIt is
not within the power of government to invade [the individual heart and mind], whether
its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard."); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-12 (1948) (holding that a program permitting children in
public schools to be released for religious education purposes violated establishment
clause of the first amendment).
"' See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (striking down on establishment
clause grounds state-mandated school prayer). See generally J. LAUBACH, SCHOOL
PRAYERS 1 (1969) (stating that the Engel decision "caused more public outcry than
any other Supreme Court decision in recent history").
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ular religion's practices, thus interfering with the "free exercise" of re-
ligion. For example, state compulsory education laws requiring parents
to keep their children in school until the age of sixteen have been held
to violate the free exercise rights of members of the Old Order Amish
religion, whose beliefs forbid formal education beyond a certain age.15
A. Government Regulation that Interferes with Religion
1. Early Cases: The Belief-Action Dichotomy
As a matter of common sense, some minimal constraints upon the
free exercise of religion are necessary. Most obvious are instances when
a belief is manifested in action that causes harm to others. 6 Early cases
interpreting the free exercise clause seized upon the distinction between
"5 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). But cf. United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982) (upholding the validity of a compulsory social security withholding tax
against a free exercise challenge brought by Old Order Amish). The Lee court said that
"[tihe state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest." Id. at 257-58. Presumably, the gov-
ernment's interest in the viability of the social security system is greater than its interest
in compulsory education to age 16.
1" Perhaps the most dramatic examples of permissible state intervention with reli-
gious practices are cases upholding statutes that prohibit handling of poisonous snakes.
In Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956), the defendant was a member
of the Congregational Holiness Church, a faction of which believed in handling poison-
ous snakes as a test of faith. See id. at 408, 88 So. 2d at 883. Hill's conviction-under a
state statute prohibiting the handling of poisonous snakes in a manner that endangers
the health or life of any person-was upheld over his free exercise claim. See id. at
411, 88 So. 2d at 886; see also Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 446, 164
S.W.2d 972, 976 (1942) (affirming a conviction under a state statute prohibiting the
handling of snakes in religious ceremonies on the ground that laws enacted to prohibit
acts that endanger the safety of others are not repugnant to the constitutional protection
of religious freedom); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 111 (Tenn. 1975)
(snake handling case holding that the free exercise clause does not include the right to
commit or maintain a nuisance), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); Harden v. State,
188 Tenn. 17, 25, 216 S.W.2d 708, 711 (1948) (affirming a conviction under a snake
handling statute on the ground that prohibitions of dangerous acts that do not interfere
with an individual's conscience or beliefs do not violate constitutionally protected reli-
gious liberties).
The protection afforded the exercise of religious faith is ordinarily very high un-
less the safety of another person is threatened. See supra note 9; see also Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I think the limits
[on religious freedom] begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide
with liberties of others or of the public. Religious activities which concern only mem-
bers of the faith are and ought to be free-as nearly absolutely free as anything can
be."). But see Mayock v. Martin, 157 Conn. 56, 58-59, 245 A.2d 574, 575-76 (1968)
(upholding the state's committal of an inmate because of concern that the inmate would
cut off his foot if he believed that God commanded him to do so. The inmate had
already removed one of his eyes and one hand because he believed he was a prophet),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 1111 (1969). "The freedom to act must have appropriate defini-
tion to preserve the enforcement of that protection." Id. at 64, 245 A.2d at 578.
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belief and action in order to assert broad governmental power to regu-
late religious conduct.1" For example, the Mormon polygamy cases sus-
tained territorial regulations that proscribed polygamous marriage,'
placed significant burdens upon belonging to a group that advocated
polygamous marriage, and even proscribed advocating polygamous
marriage. 9 The Court upheld these regulations even though the
Mormons asserted that polygamous marriage was an integral part of
their religious faith.20
This sharp doctrinal distinction between belief and action had two
major weaknesses. First, the Constitution protects free exercise of reli-
gion, not merely free belief.2 Second, conduct is an integral part of
most belief systems. Unlimited government power to regulate conduct
could effectively obliterate the right to worship.22
2. The Substantial Interest Test:
Increased Protection for Religious Conduct
Recent cases have enunciated a standard that is more protective of
the religious practices of individual claimants.23 In Wisconsin v.
Yoder,24 the Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin compulsory educa-
tion statute25 violated the right of the Old Order Amish to raise their
children in their religious tradition, 6 which emphasized practical train-
ing after the child had attended eighth grade. 7 Once it had determined
that the Amish claim to free exercise was legitimate,28 the Court bal-
anced the state's interest in compulsory education against the right of
the Amish to pursue their time-honored beliefs: "[W]e must searchingly
17 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) ("Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.").
18 See id. at 165-66.
19 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890) (upholding an Iowa election
law that required all voters to swear under oath that they would not teach others to
commit bigamy or polygamy).
20 See id. at 345; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
21 See Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 818
(1958) (arguing that the Framers did not intend for government to have unbridled
authority to regulate conduct).
2 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972) (noting the interdepen-
dence between Amish "religious beliefs and what we would call today 'life style'"
before vindicating the Amish claim to exemption from state compulsory education
laws).
2 See supra note 9.
2-4 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25 See Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969), reprinted in Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207 n.2.
2 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
27 See id. at 211.
28 See id. at 215-19.
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examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement
for compulsory education to age 16, and the impediment to those objec-
tives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish
exemption."29
In Sherbert v. Verner,30 the Court considered the claim of a Sev-
enth Day Adventist who had been fired because she refused to work on
Saturday."1 She had been offered other jobs, but had not accepted be-
cause they also entailed work on Saturdays. 2 She subsequently applied
for, and was refused, state unemployment benefits because state law
required an unemployed person to accept a job that was offered to her
and for which she was qualified.3 3 The plaintiff claimed that this re-
striction violated her right to exercise freely her religion, which re-
quired her to worship on Saturdays.3 The Court reviewed the state
statute in light of the plaintiff's free exercise claims, and stated:
[We have] rejected challenges under the Free Exercise
Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts
prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for "even when
the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, [it] is
not totally free from legislative restrictions." The conduct or
actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order. 5
Thus, the Court required the state to assert a "substantial" reason for
regulating religious behavior. On its face, this is not a difficult standard
to satisfy; almost any statute can be justified in terms of "public safety,
peace or order." 6 The Court went further, however, stating, "It is ba-
sic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occa-
sion for permissible limitation.' ",37
29 Id. at 221.
S0 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" See id. at 399.
32 See id. at 401.
'" See id. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act provided that, to
be eligible for benefits, a claimant must have been "able to work and ... available for
work," S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-113(3) (Law. Co-op. 1962), reprinted in Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 400 n.3, and that a claimant was ineligible for benefits if she had "failed,
without good cause ... to accept available suitable work when offered [her] by the
employment office or the employer. . . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114(3)(a)(ii) (Law.
Co-op. 1962), reprinted in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400 n.3.
I" See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
35 Id. at 403 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
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In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,3" the Court re-
affirmed the balancing test employed in Sherbert. Upholding another
Seventh-Day Adventist's free exercise challenge to an unemployment
benefit law, the Court asserted that "such infringements must be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the state
of a compelling interest.""9 Thus, even for facially neutral statutes,
state infringements upon religious liberty are given "strict scrutiny,"
and the state must have a "compelling interest" to justify their
application.
3. The "Compelling Interest" Test Presents Special Difficulties in
Shunning Cases
Although the standards evolved in Sherbert and Hobbie are not
entirely clear, they provide a starting point for meaningful debate when
state regulations threaten the free exercise of religion. Different consid-
erations apply, however, when the free exercise clause is asserted as a
defense to common law claims for injuries caused by shunning.
Two problems are created by a free exercise defense to common
law claims. First, Sherbert directs courts to examine the magnitude of
the state's interest in uniform enforcement of the challenged statute.40
This is a relatively easy task in cases involving laws and regulations,
because statutes often have some legislative history that reflects the state
interests involved.4' In contrast, when a religious group asserts a free
exercise defense against a common law claim such as alienation of
spousal affection,42 the state's interests are more likely to be obscure.43
In the common law context, most causes of action are aimed at
resolving the rights of individuals or groups vis-a-vis each other. The
state is not a party to the suit; its interests are represented by the court.
Consequently, the standard enunciated in Sherbert and Hobbie,
couched in terms of state interests, requires rethinking in the common
law context. The state interest at stake in a common law action is the
state's interest in providing a cause of action for a given tort. To satisfy
38 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
89 Id. at 141.
40 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
41 Even if the statute's legislative history is inadequate, when a statute is chal-
lenged, the state will be a party to the dispute and therefore will be in a position to
present its interests directly to the court.
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 (1977) (defining the tort of
alienation of spousal affection as a direct interference with the marital relationship).
41 Consider, for example, the problem of weighing the state's interest in the con-
text of a tort claim for alienation of spousal affection, see id., filed against a religious
group as a result of its shunning practice.
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the Sherbert and Hobbie standard, the state interest must be compel-
ling. Thus, if we assume that the policy underlying the tort of aliena-
tion of affection, for example, is concern for the stability of family rela-
tionships, then the court must ask itself whether it has a compelling
interest in providing relief to plaintiffs who have been alienated from
their spouses. It seems reasonable to say that state interests will be rec-
ognized as compelling more often in cases involving statutes, in which
the state has manifested its interest, than in cases in which the court
must find compelling its own role in common law actions between pri-
vate parties.
The second difficulty in applying the Sherbert rationale to shun-
ning cases, is that free exercise issues will almost always apply to both
parties. For example, imagine that a woman has been a member of a
religious group for ten years. During that time, she has married, had
children, and built a business that depends largely on trade with mem-
bers of the group. The woman becomes embroiled in a doctrinal dis-
pute with the group, and the group expels her. According to the
group's beliefs, all persons expelled must be shunned. Therefore, even
though the woman's husband has great love for his wife, the group
elders order him, on pain of expulsion, to cease all physical and emo-
tional contact with her. The children are also instructed to shun their
mother, and individual members of the group stop doing business with
her. The marriage ends in divorce and the woman sues the group and
the elders for alienation of her spouse's affection. The group, however,
responds with a free exercise defense: by shunning the plaintiff, it was
merely practicing what it believed.
If the court allows the woman's suit to proceed and requires the
group to pay tort damages to the wife, it burdens the group's free exer-
cise of religion. On the other hand, the woman may claim that she was
exercising her own religious beliefs by disputing the group's religious
principles."' Consequently, for the court to deny her a cause of action
"' The case of Robert Bear, an excommunicated Mennonite, is illustrative. His
excommunication and shunning resulted, ironically, in part from his disagreement with
the shunning practice itself. See R. BEAR, supra note 5, at 5. Both parties to the Bear
dispute were exercising their religious beliefs, yet only the "established" church was
able to avail itself of first amendment protection.
A meaningful counterpoint to Bear's case can be drawn from Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977), in which a Jehovah's Witness appealed his conviction under a
New Hampshire statute for covering the state motto "Live Free or Die" on his auto-
mobile license plate. Maynard claimed that the motto was repugnant to his religious
beliefs and that the statute violated his right to free exercise. See id. at 707. The state
advanced a "conscientious" justification for the logo, arguing that it promoted apprecia-
tion of history, individualism, and state pride. See id. at 716. The court held the state
statute unconstitutional as applied to Maynard. See id. at 717.
If we compare Maynard to Bear's case, a problem becomes apparent. Although
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would burden her right to free exercise, just as a burden would be
placed upon the religious group if the court had recognized her cause of
action.4
One possible objection to the conclusion that the group and the
individual have equivalent free exercise concerns is that the religious
group can show state action, but the individual cannot. The religious
group could argue that its religious belief, which required shunning,
would be burdened by state action if the state court recognized the wo-
Maynard was able to employ the free exercise clause defensively against the state, Bear
would have had considerable difficulty prevailing against the shunning practice of his
church, even though in both cases the lone dissenting individual was acting upon his
religious beliefs.
"' The message sent by the court would be that once the woman joins a group that
practices shunning, she is effectively foreclosed from altering her beliefs. The impact of
this result is magnified by the fact that a religious group may change its doctrine at any
time before, during, or after a member leaves, and may retroactively impose punish-
ment. This was precisely the situation in Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of
N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987), in which
Paul voluntarily withdrew from the Jehovah's Witnesses in 1975, only to have the
governing body of the church amend its rules in 1981 to provide for the shunning of
persons who had left voluntarily. See id. at 877. Paul subsequently was shunned and
brought a legal action against her former church for the harm she had suffered.
The reason for the Paul court's indifference to the Witness's shift in religious
belief is illustrated by Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) [hereinafter Hull].
Hull involved a property dispute between the general church and some of its local
factions. Under the applicable state law, the dispute was to be resolved by a "jury
decision as to whether the general church abandoned or departed from the general
tenets of faith" it had previously held. See id. at 441. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, rejected the so-called "departure-from-doctrine rule" because it violated the first
amendment: "If civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies in order to
adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free de-
velopment of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely
ecclesiastical concern." Id. at 449. One commentator has pointed out that the practical
effect of Hull is that a church may completely change its position on any religious,
political, civil, economic, or social issue without interference from the courts. See L.
PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 266 (1984). As applied to the
Paul case, this result is unsettling. Paul joined and left the church while one set of
rules was in effect; under Hull, when the church later changed the rules to her detri-
ment, she had no legal recourse.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hull offers an alternative ratio decidendi.
Harlan did not understand Justice Brennan's opinion to preclude a court from "enforc-
ing a deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down conditions limiting a religious
organization's use of the property which is granted." Hull, 393 U.S. at 452 (Harlan,
J., concurring). Likewise, a church's treatment of former members should be limited to
the conditions in force when the former members belonged to the church. This ap-
proach would not inhibit the free development of religious doctrine because the church
would remain free to alter its doctrine at any time without altering its rights with
respect to existing members; church members would be free to resign in the event that
their church changed its doctrine without warning. It would also avoid the result in
Paul, which permitted the majority to exercise control over its members past and pre-
sent. Even if such power is never exercised, its existence could quell dissent and doctri-
nal development within the church itself.
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man's tort claim."' At the same time, the religious group could argue
that the woman's free exercise rights were burdened solely by the ac-
tions of the group, which is a private actor, so that no state action is
implicated. This distinction, however, lacks substance. If the court is a
state actor when it upholds the church member's tort claim, then it is a
state actor when it upholds the religious group's free exercise defense.4
Another likely response to the woman's complaint is that she as-
sumed the risk of shunning when she joined the group. The case law,
however, does not uniformly bear out this contract-type model in prac-
tice.4 In fact, churches are free to change their doctrine at will, and
church members cannot complain to the courts.49
The very nature of shunning disputes between an individual and a
religious group is such that they will likely involve the free exercise
46 This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In that case, the Court concluded that a state court's
recognition of a civil claim constituted "state action" under the fourteenth amendment:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the [state]
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It
matters not that the law has been applied in a civil action and that it is
common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised.
Id. at 265 (citations omitted); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942
(1982) (private party creditor's use of a state system to attach debtors' property upon ex
parte application to state authorities constitutes state action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenant in a property
deed constitutes state action). The Paul court applied this principle in the religious
context. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 880 ("[T]he application of tort law to activities of a
church or its adherents in their furtherance of their religious belief is an exercise of
state power.").
11 It is debatable whether a state court engages in "state action" for the purposes
of the first and fourteenth amendments by recognizing a common law claim. The only
court that addressed this question in a shunning case concluded that state action was
present. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 880 ("State laws whether statutory or common law,
including tort rules, constitute state action." (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964))). Other courts that have decided shunning cases proceeded under
the assumption that their application of state common law to a religious group would
constitute state action. See, e.g., Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330,
335, 341 A.2d 105, 108 (1975) (concluding that the first amendment might be impli-
cated should the court recognize plaintiff's claim).
48 Cf Hull, 393 U.S. at 449-50 (stating that the first amendment prohibits courts
from evaluating issues involving church doctrine). Even if a contract model were ac-
cepted, its application in cases involving retroactive shunning would be troublesome.
For example, in Paul, the plaintiff resigned from the church at a time when the
church's doctrine contained no explicit sanction for such action. See Paul, 819 F.2d at
877. Indeed, it was not until six years after Paul's resignation that the church altered
its doctrine and began to shun members who left the church. See id. Thus, application
of the contract model to Paul would entail making the untenable argument that part of
Paul's "contract" was to agree to a practice that the church had not yet adopted.
49 See supra notes 44-45.
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rights of both parties.50 For some reason, this fact has never been recog-
nized by courts or asserted by litigants in shunning disputes. If a court
is willing to recognize the free exercise defense asserted by religious
groups that practice shunning, then it should also recognize that a
member who left the group may be protected by the free exercise
clause. Although court recognition of the plaintiff's claim would place
some burden upon the group's shunning behavior, recognition of the
group's defense will burden the decision of a member to leave, at least
from groups that sanction "shunning" of former members. The free
exercise clause should not protect the group more than it protects the
individual members of the group.5"
There are two possible solutions to the shunning dilemma. First,
courts could avoid the issue altogether by refusing to find state action
when they recognize a tort cause of action between private litigants.
Under this approach, courts would decide the underlying substantive
legal issues of the tort claim without determining whether the church
members were following their religious beliefs. Although this approach
avoids the morass of conflicting "rights" mentioned above, it is not con-
sistent with current authority that finds state action when courts recog-
nize common law tort claims.
52
If, on the other hand, the court concludes that the state action re-
quirement is satisfied when it recognizes a common law cause of action,
then the Sherbert test comes into play. The Sherbert test, however,
presents difficulties in shunning cases in which free exercise rights exist
on both sides of a dispute. Although courts need not reject the Sherbert
test in shunning cases, they must be mindful of the special concerns
presented by such cases.
II. SHUNNING, DISFELLOWSHIPPING, AND EXCOMMUNICATION
Because shunning cases do not arise often, and because of the un-
50 Cf. Bear, 462 Pa. at 331, 341 A.2d at 106 (individual was shunned because of
a doctrinal dispute with his church).
" That the first amendment protects individuals at least as much as it protects
groups is implicit in the establishment clause, which prohibits government from fur-
thering the goals of religious groups. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
Furthermore,
[T]he guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free Exercise Clause
affirmatively requires government to create an atmosphere of hospitality
and accommodation to individual belief or disbelief. . . . [Olur Constitu-
tion commands the positive protection by government of religious free-
dom-not only for a minority, however small-not only for the majority,
however large-but for each of us.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 415-16 (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
52 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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usual dynamics of these disputes, it is not surprising that courts have
applied the Sherbert test inconsistently.53 This Part examines shunning
and the types of disputes that grow out of it in order to provide an
overview of shunning and give the reader a framework in which to
apply the Sherbert rationale.
A. The Purposes of Shunning
The unity of any group that adheres to a given body of religious
ideas is dependent to some extent upon its members' fear of being
forced to live apart from the group." Generally, the more a religious
group is considered to be in the minority, the greater its need for strong
sanctions against deviations from the faith.55 There are a number of
common sense explanations for this phenomenon. First, assuming that
smaller religious sects are comprised mainly of converts from other,
more "mainstream" sects, the threat of sanctions may persuade converts
to remain faithful to their new sect after the first blush of inspiration
wears off. This appears to have been the case with the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, who adopted the practice of "disfellowshipping" sometime dur-
ing the middle part of this century-in apparent response to the
group's rapid growth.56 Furthermore, converts entering a new sect fre-
" Compare, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 819
F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he practice of shunning [does] not... constitute a suffi-
cient threat to the peace, safety, or morality of the community ... to warrant state
intervention."), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987) with Bear v. Reformed Mennonite
Church, 462 Pa. 330, 334-35, 341 A.2d 105, 107-08 (1975) (recognizing that "the
First Amendment may present a complete and valid defense to the allegations of the
complaint," but nevertheless permitting plaintiff's cause of action for shunning because
"the 'shunning' practice ... may be an excessive interference within areas of 'para-
mount state concern' .. which the courts of this Commonwealth may have authority
to regulate").
" Cf B. RAVEN & J. RuBIN, supra note 1, at 319-20 (Strong pressures toward
uniformity exerted by groups tend to depend on the following characteristics: (1) little
discrepancy of opinion within the group; (2) greater degree of relevance of the disputed
opinion to the functioning of the group; (3) high group cohesiveness based upon close
interpersonal relationships; (4) exhibition of certain personality characteristics by mem-
bers of the group, including authoritarian personalities, low self-esteem, self-blaming, a
high need for affiliation, low intelligence, anxiety, and low tolerance for ambiguity; and
(5) cultural factors that seem to exist in societies that have birth and death rates that
are both either high or low.).
1 See id. at 329 (discussing how deviants from one group will seek more compati-
ble alternative groups). The Mennonites and the Jehovah's Witnesses comprise rela-
tively small, but cohesive, segments of their surrounding populations. The experiences
of Robert Bear illustrate the strength of pressures to conform in the Mennonite church:
"I should have known how submissive the church had [my wife] to do its bidding out of
fear of losing 'unity' with the one 'pure' body, for her to turn so completely against a
husband she had lived with for thirteen years." R. BEAR, supra note 5, at 38.
" See M. PENTON, APOCALYPSE DELAYED: THE STORY OF JEHOVAH'S WIT-
NESSES 84-90 (1985).
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quently retain strong ties to family or other groups outside of the new
religion. A strong sanction against leaving or backsliding will counter-
act the temptations and pressures applied by family members and
friends to convince the recent convert to abandon the new sect.57
A second explanation for shunning is that it reinforces important
distinctions between members of the group and nonmembers.58 This
rationale seems most applicable to groups with lifestyles that differ sig-
nificantly from the surrounding culture. Hence, the practice of
meidung, or shunning, is deeply rooted in the Old Order Amish and
Reformed Mennonite churches, for whose members a distinctive lifes-
tyle is part and parcel of their religion.59 Indeed, for religions premised
upon resisting the influences of the changing world, it is no surprise
that the distinction between "us" and "them" assumes critical
importance.60
B. Shunning Cases and Application of the Sherbert Test
The purpose of this Section is to provide an overview of different
types of shunning cases. It is divided into three Subsections. The first
Subsection discusses cases in which shunned persons sue their church
for harm done to their family relationships; the second Subsection dis-
cusses harm to business relationships; and the third Subsection exam-
ines the unique issues raised when shunning results in divorces that
lead to child custody disputes. The Section concludes that courts gener-
- Cf Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D. Mass.
1982) (plaintiff alleged that church "exhorted her to sever family and marital ties and
to depend solely on the Church for emotional support"); Turner v. Unification Church,
473 F. Supp. 367, 378 (D.R.I. 1978) (plaintiff alleged that church had "deprived her
of the love and affection of her parents and friends"), affid per curiam, 602 F.2d 458
(1st Cir. 1979).
18 See B. RAVEN & J. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 319. Robert Bear's comments
illustrate how shunning can be used to isolate "sinful" members of a group. "Because I
have been excommunicated I am considered to be more sinful than if I had never
known 'the truth.'" R. BEAR, supra note 5, at 10.
51 "To the Amish there is a divine spiritual reality, the Kingdom of God, and a
Satanic Kingdom that dominates the present world. It is the duty of a Christian to keep
himself 'unspotted from the world' and separate from the desires, intent, and goals of
the worldly person." J. HOSTETLER, supra note 5, at 48; see also 1 THE MENNONITE
ENCYCLOPEDIA 657 (1955) ("The sincere efforts of its members to live scrupulously
righteous lives in a sinful world often made Mennonite communities conspicuous.");
Weber, Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOL-
OGY 323-59 (1958) (arguing that a dualistic vision of the world provides a basis for
rejecting outsiders and thus shapes social behavior).
60 See supra note 58; see also 7 ENCYCLOPIEDIA OF RELIGION 565 (1987) ("[A
Jehovah's] Witness must keep apart from the world and must obey only those secular
laws and follow only those practices of faith that are in conformity with the society's
understanding of the Bible.").
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ally have done rough justice in shunning cases, but for the wrong rea-
sons. The free exercise rights of the victim of shunning should be con-
sidered along with the rights of the church.
1. Harm to Family Relationships
Shunning severs all contact between members of the group and the
outcast. 1 The effect of shunning often depends upon the shunned per-
son's relationship with the group. To the member who is a relatively
recent convert having minimal economic ties to the group, shunning
may mean only the loss of a few close friends.2 Conversely, for the
member who was born into the sect or has an extensive social or eco-
nomic commitment to the group, shunning can cause much greater
harm. For example, if a husband leaves the sect while his wife remains
involved, the sect may require the wife to shun the husband." The
results of this type of shunning vary, but members are commonly for-
bidden from physical or social contact with a shunned spouse." Fur-
thermore, the children may also be required to choose between the
member-parent and the shunned parent. 5 In most of the cases that
reach the courts, this type of interspousal shunning results in divorce. 6
The facts of these cases illustrate the unique legal issues involved in
familial shunning cases.
a. Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church6
The Reformed Mennonite Church, as one if its fundamental prin-
ciples, teaches that an excommunicated member should be shunned. 8
The shunning includes a total boycott of the individuals by their fami-
lies. Bishop Daniel Musser of the Reformed Mennonite Church spoke
of the practice this way:
All company necessary to admonish, or to minister to
their necessities, should be freely given; but eating social
meals, or keeping social company, or having commercial in-
81 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d
875, 877 (9th Cir.) (Paul, who was not born into the religion, alleged that the church's
shunning deprived her of her friends' affection), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987).
83 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
See id.
65 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 6.
67 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975).
68 See R. BEAR, supra note 5, at 2-4 (discussing shunning in the context of the
Reformed Mennonite Church's continued adherence to the marriage-breaking
doctrine).
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tercourse, the Word of God forbids; and when it is de-
manded, must be denied under all circumstances. . . .And
thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die [Deut. XIII].
Surely, this command disturbed the sacred family relation
much more seriously than the gospel command. Besides, the
espousels [sic] of Christ are above the espousels [sic] of man.
The duties of wedlock must ever yield to our duties to God.
To be faithful to God, is the first duty of man; and conse-
quences can never enter into consideration.6"
Robert Bear was excommunicated from his church because he had
criticized the teachings and practices of the church and its bishops.
7 1
During his time as a member of the church, he had married another
member, and they had six children. Bear filed a two-count complaint
against the Reformed Mennonite Church and two of its bishops,7 1 al-
leging that his business and family were in collapse because church
officials were causing the entire community to shun him.7 ' The church
officials demurred without filing any responsive pleadings, claiming
that Bear's complaint failed to state a cause of action.73 The trial court
sustained the demurrer. 74
On appeal, the question before the court was whether the law said
"with certainty that no recovery is permitted."' "7 The court ap-
plied the Sherbert test to hold that, under the facts pled by Bear, it may
be possible for a state court to grant relief:
In our opinion, the complaint ... raises issues that the
"shunning" practice of appellee church and the conduct of
the individuals may be an excessive interference within areas
of "paramount state concern," i.e. the maintenance of mar-
riage and family relationship, alienation of affection, and the
tortious interference with a business relationship, which the
69 Id. at 4 (quoting D. MussEl, THE REFORMED MENNONITE CHURCH 360-61
(1873)). The scriptural origin of this belief is Matthew 18:15-17: "If he neglect to hear
the church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican." See J. HOsTET-
LER, supra note 5, at 62.
70 See Bear, 462 Pa. at 332, 341 A.2d at 106.
71 See id. Ironically, one of the bishops was the plaintiff's brother-in-law. See id.
at 333, 341 A.2d at 106; R. BEAR, supra note 5, at 32.
7 See Bear, 462 Pa. at 333, 341 A.2d at 106. Bear alleged that his farming busi-
ness had lost at least fifty thousand dollars because of his difficulties with the church.
See R. BEAR, supra note 5, at 76.
See Bear, 462 Pa. at 333, 341 A.2d at 106-07.
See id. at 333, 341 A.2d at 107.
75 Id. at 334, 341 A.2d at 107 (quoting Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 457 Pa. 135, 139, 320 A.2d 117, 120 (1974) (quoting Clevenstein v. Rizzuto,
439 Pa. 397, 401, 266 A.2d 623, 625 (1970))) (emphasis added by Buchanan court).
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courts of this Commonwealth may have authority to regulate,
even in light of the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise"
clauses of the First Amendment. 8
The rationale for the court's decision lay in the language in Sherbert
limiting state interference with the free exercise of religion to areas of
paramount state concern.7 Bear cited family relationships, alienation
of affection, and tortious interference with a business relationship as
matters of state concern that could potentially override free exercise
claims by defendants." Bear thus stands for the proposition that the
first amendment is not an absolute defense to common law liability for
shunning activities. Put another way, application of state tort law to
shunning cases does not necessarily violate the free exercise clause.
Bear, however, did not address whether the potential burden upon
Bear's own free exercise could enter into the balance. Bear left the
church because he disputed its religious doctrine, and he was penalized
severely for his divergent views. Had Bear upheld the church's demur-
rer, allowing the church's action to go unremedied, it would have bur-
dened Bear's decision to leave, much as it could be said to have bur-
dened the church's shunning practice to deny the church an absolute
free exercise defense.
7 9
b. Carrieri v. Bush80
In Carrieri, a husband brought an action for alienation of his
wife's affections against the pastor and elders of an unidentified reli-
gious sect.81 The trial court dismissed the case at the close of the hus-
band's evidence, and the husband appealed. 2
The facts of Carrieri are similar to the those of Bear. Mr. Car-
rieri began attending a new church with his wife, but stopped after a
short time because he "'couldn't quite agree with [the pastor's] style of
preaching.' "8 Carrieri's wife, however, continued to attend, and her
attitude toward him gradually changed." Carrieri testified: "'[H]er at-
titude became cold toward me. She treated me as a boarder, like she no
78 Id.
7 See id. at 335, 341 A.2d at 107-08 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406 (1963)).
78 See id. at 334, 341 A.2d at 107.
7' See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the free exercise rights of
plaintiffs in shunning cases).
80 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d 132 (1966).
Si See id. at 538-39, 419 P.2d at 133-34.
'2 See id. at 538, 419 P.2d at 133-34.
83 Id. at 539, 419 P.2d at 134 (quoting testimony of Carrieri at trial).
" See id.
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longer loved me, and she would come right out and tell me that.'
Finally, Carrieri confronted the pastor about his wife's changed atti-
tude and asked him to help, rather than hinder, their relationship.
"'Immediately [the pastor's] eyes got big and large and he said imme-
diately, he said, "No. You're full of the devil." My wife and children
were there. He said, "She does not have to listen to you. . . . [Inga,]
don't listen to your husband."' ""6 Carrieri also alleged that his wife
had taken an oath, administered by the pastor, that she would not leave
the church; that the pastor told her that she would die if she left the
church; that the pastor concealed his wife's whereabouts when she
moved out of the house; and that some of the church elders had advised
her to divorce Carrieri.
87
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court of Washington held
that Carrieri had successfully presented a prima facie case of alienation
of affections." The court then addressed whether the defendants' acts
were privileged or excepted from the general tort law because they
were done in furtherance of a religious belief.8 9 It concluded that gener-
ally such acts would be protected, but that in this case the privilege was
overcome because when "[i]ll will, intimidation, threats, or reckless rec-
ommendations of family separation directed toward alienating the
spouses, [are] found to exist, [they] nullify the privilege and project lia-
bility.""0 Thus, Carrieri went a step further than Bear by actually pro-
jecting tort liability onto the defendants for acts motivated by their reli-
gious beliefs, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants had
interposed a free exercise defense.91
Carrieri's recognition of a spouse's "right to be reconciled"92 can
be analogized to a shunned person's interest in making a religious deci-
sion without fear of retaliation by the church. Carrieri did not explic-
itly recognize the husband's freedom of choice as an important element
I1 d. (quoting testimony of Carrieri at trial).
88 Id. at 540-41, 419 P.2d at 135 (quoting testimony of Carrieri at trial).
87 See id. at 541-42, 419 P.2d at 135-36.
88 See id. at 544, 419 P.2d at 137.
88 See id. at 543, 419 P.2d at 137. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 686 (1977) provides that some instances of alienation of affections are privileged.
The Carrieri court relied on the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 686 (1938),
which is similar to the current version.
80 Carrieri, 69 Wash. 2d at 545, 419 P.2d at 137.
9' Carrieri relied on the free exercise clause of the Washington State constitution.
See id. at 544, 419 P.2d at 137 (citing WASH CONST. art. I, § 11, amend. 34). Wash-
ington's free exercise clause provides protections "at least as generous as those of the
federal constitution." Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc, 819 F.2d
875, 880 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987).
" Carrieri specifically recognized a "right of discordant spouses to become recon-
ciled." Carrieri, 69 Wash. 2d at 544, 419 P.2d at 137.
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of its decision, but did so implicitly by recognizing his right to be recon-
ciled. The court's approach allowed both the husband and the wife to
choose freely without fear of unprincipled outside intermeddling in
their marital relationship.
c. Analysis of Carrieri and Bear
The analysis of the shunning phenomenon presented by Bear and
Carrieri may afford little protection to religious groups that actively
practice shunning. Under this analysis, many state-recognized actions
in tort could rise to the level of "paramount" state concern required by
Sherbert. In this manner, the Sherbert test would become subjective.
The nebulous nature of the policies embodied in common law causes of
action makes it difficult for courts to determine the extent to which the
state's objectives would be impeded by the recognition of a free exercise
exception to a general tort principle. This is largely because courts de-
fine common law causes of action, such as alienation of spousal affec-
tion, in terms of individual rights, such as the right to be reconciled
with one's spouse.93
Thus, the state's interest in the reconciliation of spouses is pitted
against the church's right to shun. This collision of individual rights is
quite different from the "classic" free exercise case, in which the lone
individual pits her religious rights against a faceless and compassionless
bureaucracy 4 representing state interests often comprised of such tan-
gible concerns as administrative efficiency95 or the solvency of a govern-
" The "right to reconciliation" carries a special significance in the shunning con-
text. Such a right provides for judicial scrutiny when religious groups interfere with
reconciliation between individuals. In an analogous line of cases, courts have recognized
membership in a religious group as a property "right," justifying judicial scrutiny in
instances of alleged wrongful expulsion. See, e.g., Baugh v. Thomas, 56 N.J. 203, 208,
265 A.2d 675, 677 (1970) ("[E]xpulsion from a church or other religious organization
can constitute a serious emotional deprivation which, when compared to some losses of
property or contract rights, can be far more damaging to an individual."); Randolph v.
First Baptist Church, 53 Ohio Op. 288, 291, 120 N.E.2d 485, 488-96 (Ct. C.P. 1954)
(noting, in holding that plaintiff's expulsion was invalid because she had not been given
a fair and impartial investigation as required by the church constitution, that church
membership is a property right that can be reviewed by a court).
9' See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)
(Plaintiff sought religious exemption from state unemployment law denying her bene-
fits because she was discharged for refusing to work on her Sabbath out of religious
convictions adopted after commencing her employment.); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986) (Air Force doctor sought religious exception to military dress code
prohibiting the wearing of headgear, including a yarmulke, while indoors.).
" See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-259 (1982) (because a com-
prehensive national social security system that provided for voluntary participation
would be almost impossible to administer, the governmental interest in assuring
mandatory and continuous participation is very high).
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ment program."6 This difference suggests why courts that apply the
Sherbert analysis to shunning cases rarely move beyond incantations of
the "paramount" state interest language before applying general com-
mon law principles. The result is that free exercise claims are decided
by appeal to the common law vernacular of ill will, malice, and the
like."
That is not to say that courts have universally adopted the stance
suggested by Bear and Carrieri. Some courts tend to afford a near-
absolute immunity to activities conducted in the name of religion.9"
This approach holds potential for tragic results in individual cases,
however, because it does not provide for scrutiny of religious activity
that may cause substantial harm. Examples of this approach will be
discussed in the next part.
d. Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc.9"
The plaintiff in Paul was a "disassociated" member of the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses.100 As such, her status was similar to that of the plain-
tiffs in Bear and Carrieri, with the important distinction that Paul did
not sue for alienation of affection.101 Paul alleged common law torts of
9' See, e.g., id. at 258 (stating that mandatory participation in the social security
program is indispensable to its fiscal vitality).
97 The Supreme Court has developed a similar standard to deal with challenges to
the decisions of ecclesiastical authorities. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) ("[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments
mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal" absent "fraud or collusion.").
9 See Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987); Gruwald v. Ben Zion Bornfreund, No. CV-
85-3338 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1988).
99 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 289 (1987). Paul illustrates
the difficulty of finding a meaningful standard to apply to cases, such as those involving
shunning, in which state common law causes of action are asserted against religious
organizations. In Paul, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the test it had previously for-
mulated to test free exercise challenges to statutory restrictions. See Callahan v. Woods,
736 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1984) (setting out the Ninth Circuit's test for whether a
neutrally based statute violates the free exercise clause as considering (1) the magnitude
of the statute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief; (2) the existence of a
compelling state interest justifying the burden on the exercise of the belief; and (3) the
extent to which a recognition of an exemption from the statute would impede the objec-
tives sought to be advanced by the state).
100 According to the doctrine of the Jehovah's Witnesses, disassociated members
must be shunned. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 876-77; J. BERGMAN, supra note 5, at xxiii.
101 See Paul, 819 F.2d at 877. This distinction is relevant for a number of rea-
sons. The Bear and Carrieri courts were both concerned with the state's compelling
interest in "the maintenance of marriage and family relationship." Bear, 462 Pa. at
334, 341 A.2d at 107; see also Carrieri, 69 Wash. 2d at 544-45, 419 P.2d at 137
(asserting that the free exercise of religious beliefs, although protected by the state con-
stitution, does not grant license to "wrongfully interfere" with familial relationships).
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defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud, and outrageous conduct against
her former church."0 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the church.'0 3
Paul stands in sharp contrast to Carrieri, because both courts
purported to apply Washington state law, yet reached different re-
sults.GS While it is possible to distinguish the two cases on a number of
factual grounds, 05 the fact remains that both courts applied Washing-
ton common law to cases involving conflicts between claims of intangi-
ble emotional harm and free exercise privilege. Furthermore, the Paul
court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Bear, had "re-
cently recognized a cause of action in tort arising from the practice of
shunning," 08 but suggested that the Pennsylvania court had embarked
upon an unconstitutional course: "Were shunning considered to be tor-
tious conduct, the guarantee of the free exercise of religion would pro-
vide that it is, nonetheless, privileged conduct."' 07 The analysis that led
the Ninth Circuit to this conclusion warrants further consideration.
The court began by accepting shunning as a practice mandated by
the Jehovah's Witnesses's religious beliefs, which are based on canoni-
cal texts that the court was not permitted to reinterpret.0 The court
then asserted that the free exercise protections provided by the Wash-
ington and federal Constitutions are identical.' The court also rea-
soned that judicial recognition of common law torts constitutes state ac-
Although Paul was married to a church member, she sought damages for defamation,
invasion of privacy, fraud, and outrageous conduct. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 877. She
could claim to have been harmed only by the loss of friends. Her own family had been
"disfellowshipped" before she chose to leave the Witnesses herself. See id. at 876.
Therefore, Paul does not fall directly under the Carrieri analysis, which deals with
harm to family relationships.
102 See id. at 877.
103 See id. at 883.
104 Compare Paul, 819 F.2d at 878-80 (holding that, under Washington law,
there was no need to determine whether Washington courts would grant relief for the
alleged intentional torts because the defendants were privileged under the free exercise
clause of the Washington and U.S. Constitutions) with Carrieri, 69 Wash. 2d at 542-
45, 419 P.2d at 136-37 (under Washington law, alienation of affections was actionable
as an intentional tort despite its religious context).
10l Compare, e.g., Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 n.7 (no evidence that the members of the
church had acted with malice) with Carrieri, 69 Wash. 2d at 545, 419 P.2d at 137
(case decided on the ground that the church members had acted maliciously); Paul, 819
F.2d at 877 (friends of plaintiff would not talk to her) with Carrieri, 69 Wash 2d at
539-42, 419 P.2d at 134-36 (plaintiff's relations with his wife grew worse until she
divorced him).
108 Paul, 819 F.2d at 878.
107 Id. at 879.
108 See id.
100 See id. at 880.
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tion," ° concluding that imposition of tort damages for shunning would
constitute a direct burden upon religion by restricting the free exercise
of the Jehovah's Witnesses' religious faith.' Only after the court held
"the practice of shunning not to constitute a sufficient threat to the
peace, safety, or morality of the community as to warrant state inter-
vention"11 2 did it look to the particulars of Paul's situation,'" conclud-
ing that the alleged intangible emotional harm did not "justify the im-
position of tort liability for religious conduct."" 4
The court stated that it was appropriate to allow a free exercise
defense to the church in this case, because Paul was a former member,
and, as such, had impliedly consented to any action that might be taken
against her by her former church." 5 What the court did not point out
in its discussion of Paul's "consent" is that the church had changed its
policy respecting "disassociated" members after Paul left."' In effect,
the church unilaterally and retroactively withdrew Paul's right to asso-
ciate with her friends." 7 To say, as did the Ninth Circuit, that Paul's
11 See id.; see also supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing state
action as applied to shunning cases).
1 See Paul, 819 F.2d at 880-81.
112 Id. at 883.
13 See id. at 876-77.
114 Id. at 883. The acts of which Paul complained included one occasion when a
close childhood friend told Paul, "I can't speak to you. You are disfellowshipped." Id.
at 887. On another occasion, Paul attended a Tupperware party at the home of a
Witness only to be informed that the church elders had instructed the congregation not
to speak to her. See id.
11 See id. at 883. See generally C. ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW
223-24 (1917). Professor Zollman likens church membership to a contract:
[Church membership] is "one of contract" and is therefore exactly what
the parties to it make it and nothing more. A person who joins a church
covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the benefits
which result from such a union he will submit to its control and be gov-
erned by its laws and usages and customs whether they are of an ecclesias-
tical or temporal character to which laws, usages and customs he assents
as to so many stipulations of a contract.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship
Nonsectarian Church, 39 Cal. 2d 121, 131-32, 245 P.2d 481, 487 (1952) (en banc)
(citing Zollman to support a general rule that courts will not interfere in ecclesiastical
matters), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 938 (1953).
116 When Paul voluntarily left the Jehovah's Witnesses, there was no express
sanction for withdrawing from the group; not until six years later did the Governing
Body of Jehovah's Witnesses rule that disassociated members were to be shunned. See
Paul, 819 F.2d at 877.
"' In Hobbie, the Supreme Court concluded that it was irrelevant that the plain-
tiff, who was challenging a state unemployment regulation, had converted to a new
faith after two and one-half years on the job and as a result developed a conflict with
her work schedule. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987). It is thus difficult to reconcile Hobbie, (an individual can change her beliefs
and still assert a free exercise claim against the state), Hull, 393 U.S. 440 (1969),
(permitting a church to change its doctrine at any time and still claim free exercise
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friends decided that they no longer wished to associate with her..8 ig-
nores the fact that her friends' "decision" was influenced by the threat
that anybody who associated with Paul risked being disassociated
herself.119
The Paul court's holding that state common law torts always im-
pose an unconstitutional burden upon religious exercise, was unwar-
ranted. In Paul, the Ninth Circuit fell prey to a distortion precisely
opposite from the one that confronts courts dealing with an individual's
free exercise claim in the statutory context. 20 The individual plaintiff
who asserts her free exercise claim against a large bureaucracy capable
of justifying almost any action in terms of sweeping governmental in-
terests runs the risk of appearing to be a troublemaker.12 In the shun-
ning context, however, these roles are reversed; the disgruntled former
member with dubious-sounding claims of intangible emotional harm
confronts a unified church bureaucracy wielding the twin-edged sword
of scriptural mandate and constitutional protection. In reality, shunning
cases almost always involve good-faith disputes over religious doctrine.
It is the difference of opinion on religious issues that compels the for-
mer member to leave the church or the church to excommunicate
her. 22 Both parties to the dispute invariably act according to the dic-
tates of their respective views of religion.
If a court recognizes a cause of action for the former member, it
burdens the free exercise of the group's faith. When families are in-
volved however, or economic interests are at stake, a blanket refusal to
recognize a cause of action for the former member goes too far the other
way. The former member is effectively foreclosed from changing her
beliefs or taking issue with church authorities, while, under Paul, the
church is free to fashion a suitable "sanction" retroactively, after the
protection), and Paul, (both the church and the individual changed their positions on
issues of conscience, but only the church's free exercise rights were protected).
11 See Paul, 819 F.2d at 883.
11 See id. at 876.
120 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting an Old Order
Amish challenge to social security taxes).
121 See id. at 258-60. The Court in Lee rejected Lee's claim to a religious exemp-
tion from social security withholding requirements, reasoning that the government's
interest in the nationwide administration of the social security system "requires that
some religious practices yield to the common good." Id. at 259.
122 See, e.g., Paul, 819 F.2d at 876 (plaintiff withdrew from church because she
disputed the disfellowshipping of her parents and was prohibited from discussing this
feeling with other members); Carrieri, 69 Wash. 2d at 539, 419 P.2d at 134 (action for
alienation of affections after events arising out of appellant's determination that he
"'couldn't quite agree with [the pastor's] style of preaching' "); see also R. BEAR,
supra note 5, at 36-37 (author's excommunication and shunning were a result of point-
ing out that "the church wasn't as it professed to be").
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member has left, in order to discourage errant behavior.12
Paul's weakness lay in the court's wooden application of the Sher-
bert analytical framework, which was designed to protect an individ-
ual's right to free exercise in the face of oppressive government regula-
tion. 24 In the shunning context, however, the alignment of the parties
is reversed: the individual complains of oppressive church practices.
Faced with competing rights to free exercise, the court must play the
role of the "state" by choosing either to recognize or dismiss a free
exercise defense. 25
2. Economic Damage
Shunning can also cause tangible economic harm. In Lide v.
Miller,2 ' a dentist brought an action against church elders for tortious
interference with business relations. The church elders had read a
statement alleging instances of Lide's misconduct to their congregation.
The apparent result of this proclamation was harm to Lide's reputation
and dental practice. 2
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals stated that it had "no jurisdic-
tion over and no concern with [] purely ecclesiastical questions and
controversies," but that it did "have jurisdiction as to civil, contract and
property rights even though such rights are involved in, or arise from, a
church controversy."12 The court, citing Bear, reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the church elders and remanded
the case for trial upon the merits.
129
Lide's significance is that it compels members of a religious group
to exercise the same standard of care as an ordinary person when mak-
ing statements that are likely affect a former member's standing in the
community. This places former church members on an equal legal foot-
ing with those who remain in the group.
Similarly, Bear involved a claim for harm to the plaintiff's busi-
ness in addition to his claim for emotional damages.18 Not only was
Bear losing business, but he also found himself unable to hire workers,
122 See supra note 45.
124 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
125 See Paul, 819 F.2d at 879-80; Carrieri, 69 Wash. 2d at 544-45, 419 P.2d at
137.
128 573 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
127 See id.
128 Id. at 615 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976)).
129 See id. at 616.
"I0 See Bear, 462 Pa. at 333, 341 A.2d at 106; supra notes 71-72 and accompany-
ing text.
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obtain loans, or market his produce.1"1 The Bear court identified tor-
tious interference with a business relationship as one possible area of
"'paramount state concern.' "132
Bear raises challenging questions of the extent to which "lifestyle"
is bound up with religious beliefs. Is a church "exercising" its religion
when it directs its members not to grant credit to or enter into the
employ of a former member? What if the church asserts publicly, as
apparently was the case in Bear, that the former member was
dishonest?"'3
These questions also involve difficult issues of public policy."'
The Mennonite context is perhaps the easiest in which to address such
issues because of the intimate relationship between religious belief and
the community way of life.'3 5 The more a given group's beliefs are in
harmony with its members' way of life and the longer their practices
have been established, the stronger will be their claims to religious mo-
tivation for economic sanctions.'3 It is the tightly knit group with a
distinctive way of life that is most likely to engage in shunning practices
in order to ensure uniformity within the group.1
3 7
Although neither court fully considered the implications of its deci-
sion in favor of the shunning victim, both the Bear and Lide courts
reached the correct result on their respective facts. 3 It is extremely
difficult to ascertain on a demurrer or a summary judgment motion the
veracity of a given communication or its intended effect. It may be ap-
propriate in some contexts to examine the history of economic sanctions
against former members. Greater deference should be accorded a group
that has practiced shunning as a central tenet of its faith over an ex-
tended period of time than is given, for example, sanctions enunciated
extemporaneously from a pulpit. Otherwise, religious groups would be
free to adopt ad hoc sanctions without regard to the circumstances of
131 See Bear, 462 Pa. at 333, 341 A.2d at 106.
132 Id. at 334, 341 A.2d at 107.
133 See R. BEAR, supra note 5, at 41.
13, See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (rejecting the
free exercise claim of a sectarian university that was denied tax exempt status because
its religiously-inspired, racially-discriminatory admissions practices violated public
policy).
13. Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (noting the intimate connec-
tion between Amish belief and lifestyle).
136 Cf id. at 219 (noting that 300 years of consistent practice of the Amish reli-
gion and strong evidence of a sustained faith regulating its members' way of life sup-
port the claim that a state requirement of compulsory education until age 16 would
"gravely endanger if not destroy" the free exercise of Amish beliefs).
137 See B. RAvEN & J. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 319.
138 Cf Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58 (permitting the government to impose a limitation
on free exercise if essential to achieve an overriding public policy interest).
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each case and later invoke the protection of the free exercise clause.
Even when a given custom of economic sanctions has been in effect for
a long time and occupies a central position in the group's doctrine,
however, the court should still consider the free exercise interests of the
victim of the shunning before reaching a decision.
3. Child Custody
A standard different from other cases involving shunning is re-
quired in child custody cases. First, neither party to the dispute claims
to have been injured by the shunning practice; rather, one party is
likely to claim that the child will be emotionally harmed if she is raised
in an environment in which she is taught to reject that parent. Because
the parents cannot agree on a custody decision, the court is called upon
to substitute its judgment for that of the parents in deciding what is
best for the child. Second, no church or church representative is a de-
fendant for her role in compelling a third party to shun the plaintiff.
Religious differences may have fueled the dispute that has culminated
in a custody battle, but the group advocating the shunning is not being
called upon to pay directly for the results of its religious belief; rather,
the spouse applying the practice of shunning seryes as a proxy for the
church. The outcome of the child custody dispute therefore can be said
to impose only an indirect burden on the group's religious practice; the
group can continue its shunning practices, which may be directed to-
ward the child if the child chooses not to follow the path of the parent
remaining in the group.
If a child resides with the parent who continues to be affiliated
with the religious group, she may be subjected to a steady barrage of
ill-will directed towards the other parent.. 9 and will be taught to avoid
contact with that parent as much as possible. 40 This state of affairs
... Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 73, 75-76 (Alaska 1977) (disfellow-
shipped church member claiming that he would receive "little, if any, access to his
children by virtue of his disfellowshipped status"); Bear, 462 Pa. at 333, 341 A.2d at
106 (1975) (children would not speak to father, an excommunicated church member).
A parent's intentions in isolating her children from a shunned spouse are not nec-
essarily malicious. See Johnson, 564 P.2d at 73 (father introduced testimony indicating
that his wife would try to keep him apart from his children because "a disfellow-
shipped member of the Jehovah's Witnesses is believed to be under, or in danger of
coming under, satanic control"); cf. Linderman v. Linderman, 364 N.W.2d 872, 874
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (children expressed their desire to live with father, rather than
shunned mother, at least in part because their ongoing church involvement was impor-
tant to them).
40 See Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505-06 (Ct. App. 1967) (mother
testified at trial that if she received custody of young child, she would encourage him to
separate from his father on religious grounds); Bear, 462 Pa. at 332-33, 341 A.2d at
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does not comport with normal conceptions of a child's best interests.""
If courts, however, consider one parent's belief in shunning in granting
custody to the other parent, they may be imposing a substantial burden
on the shunning parent's free exercise rights.1 ' Given these sensitive
issues, the parent's religion must be considered in a custody case only if
the child's psychological well-being is potentially in danger.
Quiner v. Quiner4 is an example of a case in which the court did
not take the parents' religion into account in determining the child's
best interests. In Quiner, the mother belonged to a religious sect called
the "Plymouth Brethren," or "Exclusive Brethren." This sect believed
in what it termed the "Doctrine of Separation," which required mem-
bers of the sect to avoid contact with nonmembers as much as possi-
ble.144 The father had fallen away from the group and religious differ-
ences eventually led to divorce and a dispute over child custody. 45 At
trial, the mother was questioned about the role that the Doctrine of
Separation would play in her five year old son's upbringing: "Q***. If
your son joined the religious group according to the beliefs of your reli-
gion, he could not associate with his father; is that correct? In other
words, he would have to practice the principle of separation from his
father; is that correct? A*** Yes, he would. 1 46 The trial court decided
that this type of arrangement would not be in the best interests of the
child and awarded custody to the father."4 The California Court of
106 (shunning requires a total boycott of the disfellowshipped member by other church
members, including that member's children).
141 The child's best interests is the standard applied in most adoption, guardian-
ship, and custody proceedings. See generally L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREE-
DOM 703-04, 708, 711 (rev. ed. 1967) (noting various components of a child's best
interests including health, temporal welfare, and happiness, and the effect of religious
considerations on these interests); Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardian-
ship and Custody, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 376, 393-94 (1954) (advocating the inclusion of
the parents' religious affiliations as one consideration in decisions involving the child's
best interests in adoption proceedings).
142 See, e.g., Johnson, 564 P.2d at 76 (holding that refusal to award custody to the
mother could not be based upon her stated intention to raise children as Jehovah's
Witnesses). But cf Morris v. Morris, 271 Pa. Super. 19, 34-35, 412 A.2d 139, 146-47
(1979) (holding that child's psychological well-being was a more compelling interest
than parent's free exercise right and conditioning father's visitation rights upon agree-
ment not to involve daughter in religious solicitation).
a43 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1967).
144 See id. at 504, 508.
145 See id. at 506-08.
148 Id. at 505.
147 See id. at 504. The court operated under the state law presumption that, "all
things being equal, the custody of a child of tender years should go to the mother." Id.
at 517. In this case, however, the trial court not only granted custody to the father, but
it conditioned the mother's visitation rights on an injunction prohibiting her from ex-
posing the child to any doctrines or beliefs of the "Exclusive Brethren." See id. at 504.
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Appeals reversed, stating:
If a court has the right to weigh the religious beliefs or
lack of them of one parent against those of the other, for the
purpose of making the precise conclusion as to which one is
for the best interests of a child, we open a Pandora's box
which can never be closed. . . . [T]he First Amendment in
conjunction with the Fourteenth solves the problem; it le-
gally prohibits such religious evaluations.148
Custody was awarded to the mother, who stated that she would obey,
albeit reluctantly, a court order giving the father visitation rights. 49
The appeals court in Quiner apparently felt that the best way to
deal with the religion problem was to ignore it. The mother's interest
in free exercise therefore outweighed the child's best interests, or, put
another way, the religious beliefs of the parents were irrelevant to the
child's best interests, whatever the impact of those beliefs on the child's
upbringing.
In Johnson v. Johnson,15 the court was presented with facts like
those in Quiner, and it also chose not to consider the parents' religion
in its custody decision. In Johnson, both father and mother were Jeho-
vah's Witnesses. The father was disfellowshipped for willfully smoking
cigarettes 51 and was subsequently shunned. This rift placed a strain on
the marital relationship and eventually led to divorce. 52 The trial court
granted custody of the children to the wife based on the "tender years"
doctrine;153 the husband appealed, arguing that "he [would] be allowed
little, if any, access to his children by virtue of his disfellowshipped
status. 1 54 The Supreme Court of Alaska remanded the case because
the trial court had incorrectly based its custody decision upon the
tender years doctrine, and it directed the lower court to reconsider the
custody decision using the criteria put forth in its decision without ref-
erence to the mother's religious beliefs.1 55 "[Clertainly, we cannot use
Linda's continued membership in the Jehovah's Witnesses as a basis
for directing the trial court to award the children to Rudy. To do so
would be violative of her right to freedom of religion under the First
148 Id. at 517.
149 See id. at 505, 517.
150 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977).
151 See id. at 72.
182 See id. at 72-73.
183 See id. at 73.
154 Id. at 75-76.
155 See id. at 75, 77. TheJohnson court emphasized that custody decisions should
be based upon serving the child's "best interests." See id. at 74-75.
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Amendment."15 Thus, Johnson was in agreement with Quiner. In
fact, it went one step further by asserting that the best interests of chil-
dren did not include assimilation into the dominant culture.157 This as-
sertion countered the husband's assertion that, by granting custody to
the mother, the court was not only denying the children free access to
him, but also restricting the children's access to the "expansive atmo-
sphere" of mainstream society.' 58
The court in Morris v. Morris,'59 took the opposite approach by
accounting for the likely effect of the parent's religious practices on the
child. Morris did not involve shunning, but its rationale is instructive.
The father, who was a Jehovah's Witness, sought to overturn a lower
court custody decree conditioning his visitation rights upon his agree-
ment not to take his five-year-old daughter on any door-to-door reli-
gious solicitations.16 ' The father claimed that this condition violated his
free exercise rights. Expert testimony had been offered at trial indicat-
ing that door-to-door solicitation might be psychologically harmful to so
young a child and that the inconsistency between the father's and the
mother's religious teachings would likely result in the child's disregard-
ing all religion. 61 The father argued that this testimony was unproven
and that, in any case, the expert had only indicated that religious solici-
tation might prove harmful to the child.16 2 The court responded by stat-
ing that "we cannot accept an argument that the absence of present
harm constricts the court's power to act. Were this the case, we would
have to allow the psychological harm to ... [the child] to progress to a
mentally crippling point before action could be taken." '163 Thus, the
Morris court not only placed a burden upon the parent's free exercise
in order to accommodate the best interests of the child, but it also did
not require the prevailing party to demonstrate present harm to the
child; the court instead based its decision on a prediction of harmful
future effects.'"
There are arguments to be made for and against each approach in
the child custody context. By refusing to consider the likely effects of a
188 Id. at 76.
187 See id. (citing Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Alaska 1972)).
188 See id.
189 271 Pa. Super. 19, 412 A.2d 139 (1979).
160 See id. at 23, 412 A.2d at 141.
161 See id. at 33, 412 A.2d at 146.
162 See id. at 34, 412 A.2d at 146.
161 Id.
164 Cf Mayock v. Martin, 157 Conn. 56, 62-65, 245 A.2d 574, 577-78 (1968)
(allowing the state to confine the plaintiff to a mental hospital because doctors believed
his religious beliefs might induce him to cut off his foot), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1111
(1969).
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parent's religious practices in a custody decision, courts avoid the temp-
tation to inject their own morality-or that of the "dominant cul-
ture"-as a hypothetical "best" morality for the child."6 5 On the other
hand, other cases illustrate that ignoring the likely effects of the par-
ents' religious practices could sacrifice the best interests of the child.166
Perhaps the most reasonable line of analysis to follow in child cus-
tody cases is slightly different from the one this Comment advocated
earlier in the context of alienation of affections and tortious interference
with contractual relationships. 67 First, the court would have to estab-
lish that the best interests of the child are a matter of paramount state
concern.' 8 The court would then make the custody decision on a relig-
1"5 By abstaining from the religious issue, courts avoid results such as the one
reached in Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jac. 266, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (1817), in which the
English poet Percy Bysshe Shelley was denied custody of his two children after the
death of his wife because he was an avowed atheist:
This is a case in which ... the father's principles cannot be misun-
derstood, in which his conduct, which I cannot but consider as highly im-
moral, has been established ... as the effect of those principles .
I cannot, therefore, think that I should be justified in delivering over
these children [to the father] ... "
Id. at 851.
Shelley had published works on atheism. See Shelley & Hogg, The Necessity of
Atheism, in SHELLEY'S PROSE 37 (D.L. Clark ed. 1954). The court referred to publica-
tion of atheistic works as Shelley's "immoral conduct." See Shelley, Jac. 266, 37 Eng.
Rep. at 850-51.
Atheism and agnosticism have been recurrent themes in child custody and adop-
tion proceedings in the United States. See, e.g., Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 281
N.E.2d 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346, appeal denied for lack of afederal question, 407 U.S.
917 (1972). In Dickens, a couple's application to become adoptive parents was refused
because they had no religious affiliation. The state statute then governing the placement
of adopted children directed that they should be placed so as to give effect to the reli-
gious wishes of the natural parents. The court rejected the couple's free exercise claim,
reasoning that
[u~nder these circumstances, religious conformity provisions which serve a
valid secular purpose may not be said to discriminate against or penalize
the petitioners because they do not have a religious affiliation, nor are they
thereby placed under an obligation to assume a religious faith in order to
be able to adopt a child.
Id. at 68, 281 N.E.2d at 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 350; see also In re Adoption of "E," 59
N.J. 36, 40, 51, 279 A.2d 785, 787, 793 (1971) (reversing a lower court judgment that
"plaintiffs' lack of belief in a Supreme Being rendered them unfit to be adoptive par-
ents" and holding that the lower courts' treatment of the plaintiffs' atheism as control-
ling in the adoption proceedings had violated their free exercise rights).
... See, e.g., Morris, 271 Pa. Super. at 34-35, 412 A.2d at 146-47 (attempting to
prevent psychological harm to a child by taking into account the father's religious prac-
tices and therefore conditioning his visitation rights on his agreement not to involve the
child in door-to-door solicitation).
167 See supra notes 61-138 and accompanying text.
168 See L. PFEFFER, supra note 141, at 708 ("[Wjhen a court is called upon to fix
the custody of a child, as where the parents separate, the universal rule is that it should
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ion-blind basis. This decision would stand unless one party, or a court-
appointed expert, satisfied her burden of proving that a substantial
likelihood exists that the child's best interests would be disserved as the
proximate result of the other parent's religious practices.169 In other
words, a parent's religion would be considered only if one of the parties
claimed that the beliefs and practices of the other parent would jeop-
ardize the child's physical or psychological well-being. If the party does
not raise this issue or meet the burden, then the rationale for the court's
holding should remain religion-blind. Religion would thus become one
factor to be weighed in a custody decision aimed primarily at furthering
the child's best interests.
The mechanics of this test can be illustrated by applying it to the
facts of Quiner. In Quiner, the court was required to choose between
awarding custody to the mother, who practiced the principle of separa-
tion, and the father, who did not. The trial court had awarded custody
to the father and had conditioned the mother's visitation rights upon
her agreement to refrain from indoctrinating the child in her relig-
ion. " ' The trial court also found, however, that both parents were of
sound character and that both were devoted to the child.'
In circumstances in which both parents are of sound character and
devoted to the child, custody should be granted to the parent who
would be awarded custody if religion were not a factor. If this religion-
blind test had been applied in Quiner, the mother would have been
awarded custody of the young child, because under California law, "all
things being equal, the custody of a child of tender years should go to
the mother."'7 2 This decision would be final unless the father could
produce evidence that the child's best interests would be frustrated as
the proximate result of the mother's religion. Given that (1) the mother
agreed to abide by a court visitation order; (2) the mother promised to
teach the child to love and respect his father; 3 and (3) the court found
be guided exclusively by what it deems to be the child's best interests."); see also John-
son, 564 P.2d at 74 (noting Alaska law requiring courts to consider the best interests of
the child in custody cases); Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 509 ("The law of this state makes
it abundantly clear that the best interests of the child is the polestar of decision in
custody cases. We know of no state in which it is different."); Morris, 271 Pa. Super.
at 24, 412 A.2d at 141 ("It is well established that in all cases involving the custody of
a child, the paramount consideration is the best interests and welfare of the child. ...
[This] embraces the child's physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being.").
"" Cf Note, supra note 141, at 393 ("Before transferring a child from one custo-
dian to another because of the religious component, thought should certainly be devoted
to the psychological or economic harm which may result to the youngster.").
"I0 See Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
171 See id.
172 Id. at 517.
171 See id. at 505.
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the psychological evidence adduced at trial inadequate to justify the
conclusion that the child's well-being would be impaired by exposure to
the "Doctrine of Separation," the facts of Quiner would warrant grant-
ing custody to the mother.
The above standard is the proper one to apply in shunning cases
involving child custody. In the child custody context, the court's deci-
sion is not immutable. 4 Therefore, if evidence came to light that a
child was being harmed by the religious practices of one parent, the
court could order a new arrangement. This standard would favor relig-
ion-neutral custody decisions absent compelling evidence that the child
would be harmed.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has adopted an approach to religious shunning
that has never been used in a court of law. The approach advocated by
this Comment, however, is very simple: when religious groups shun
their members, more is at stake than the religious freedom of the group.
Each member of the group has free exercise rights at least as compel-
ling as the group that shuns them.
The test of Sherbert v. Verner' 75 should be applied with this guid-
ing principle in mind. When courts ignore the free exercise rights of
individuals and look only at the religious claims of groups, they elevate
the group's religion over the individual's religion. This is a dangerous
path to follow. It gives religious groups virtually unfettered coercive
power over their members and former members and blocks dissent and
doctrinal development.
Finally, this Comment has argued for a different test when shun-
ning behavior becomes an issue in child custody disputes. This standard
would ignore religious considerations unless there is a substantial dan-
ger of harm to the child.
1'4 See, e.g., Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 676, 682, 242 P.2d 321, 324
(1952) ("Custody decrees are universally subject to modification upon a showing of
facts that require a change in the order to protect . . . the welfare of the child.");
Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 518 (stating that the father could have the custody decision
changed if it turned out that the child was being harmed by the mother's religion).
175 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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